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Abstract
Social unrest often erupts suddenly and diffuses quickly. What drives people to
overcome their collective action problem and join a riot or protest, turning what is
initially a small event into a widespread movement? We address this question by
examining the Swing riots of 1830-31. The communication constraints of the time
induced spatio-temporal variation in exposure to news about the uprising, allowing
us to estimate the role of contagion in the spread of the riots. We find that local
(rather than national) sources of information were central in driving contagion, and
that this contagion magnified the impact that social and economic fundamentals had
on riots by a factor of 2.65. Our historical data allow us to overcome a number
of econometric challenges, but the Swing riots are of independent interest as well:
they contributed to the passage of the Great Reform Act, a key step in Britain’s
institutional development.
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1 Introduction
Episodes of social unrest, including riots and protests, often erupt suddenly and diffuse
quickly from one area to another, as seen in recent examples including the 1992 Los Angeles
riots, the 2011 London riots and the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. What
drives people to overcome their collective action problem and join a riot or a protest, turning
what is initially a small event into a widespread movement? Economic theory provides two
sets of explanations for why social unrest spreads. One set emphasizes social and economic
fundamentals including poverty, unemployment and ethnicity (see, e.g., Collier and Hoeﬄer,
2004; Esteban and Ray, 2011; Campante and Chor, 2012b; Mitra and Ray, 2014), while the
other emphasizes contagion (see, e.g., Granovetter, 1978; Kuran, 1989; Lohmann, 1994).1
Riots are costly, and we may want to devise policies to prevent them; some protests, on the
other hand, may seek democratic change and so are worthy of being supported. In order
to formulate effective policies, we must improve our understanding of the mechanisms that
drive the diffusion of riots and protests. Unfortunately, the econometric challenges involved
in isolating contagion from other channels of diffusion means that there is currently little, if
any, compelling evidence on the matter. In this paper, we use historical data to overcome
these challenges and provide new evidence on what drives the spread of social unrest.
We focus on a specific incident of social unrest, the Swing riots of 1830-1831, and
address two related issues. First, we isolate contagion from the other channels of diffusion
by exploiting the time and spatial variation in exposure to riots that was generated by the
communication constraints of the early 1830s. We then study the specific mechanisms the
drove this contagion, paying particular attention to whether local or national information
externalities were central to this process. Second, we investigate the factors that correlate
with the occurrence of riots in a location, focusing on the importance of economic and
social fundamentals relative to contagion. For this purpose, we collected a large dataset
that tracks the evolution of the Swing riots over 40 weeks in 1830-31 across more than
10,000 parishes in England. There is a distinct advantage to focusing on riots instead of
other forms of social unrest: they are often localized, and can be clearly separated into a
1We use diffusion to mean the overall spread of the riots (regardless of the underlying drivers), while
contagion is used as a synonym for Manski (1993)’s endogenous effect: the riots that happen because other
riots were taking place nearby.
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number of discrete incidents that are easy to observe in the data because they happen in
different places at different points in time.
Engaging with these questions using contemporary data would present a number of
insurmountable challenges. There is typically little variation in terms of when people first
become exposed to a riot: modern communication technologies enable news about a riot to
spread very quickly and reach a large audience. Partly as a result, riots typically spread over
the course of a day or two. This limited variation in terms of when different locations become
exposed to the riots makes it difficult to distinguish between fundamentals and contagion.
This econometric problem can be described using the terminology introduced by Manski
(1993): riots can result from the endogenous effect (due to riots nearby), contextual effects
(due to fundamentals in neighboring locations) or correlated effects (neighboring locations
have similar fundamentals and are exposed to the same shocks). Contemporary riots data
do not allow to differentiate between them. Furthermore, ease of transport today means
that people can travel considerable distances to participate in a riot. This makes it difficult
to link local economic and social conditions (e.g., the level of poverty) to the personal
conditions of the rioters; in short, we do not know what the right fundamentals are or how
to control for them.
The Swing riots allow us to address these identification problems. First, we exploit the
time variation in exposure to the Swing riots to separate contagion from the contextual and
correlated effects. This is possible because by modern standards, the Swing riots unfolded
in slow motion, and the process was allowed to develop more or less unchecked for some
time before the government intervened. However, the riots still spread fast enough for all
other factors, including the fundamentals, to remain unchanged in the relevant time frame.
Together, these facts suggest that we can use the spatio-temporal variation in exposure to
nearby riots to estimate contagion, while dealing with the fundamentals (the contextual
and correlated effects) by using parish fixed effects. In short, with our historical data we
can estimate contagion because a parish’s exposure to nearby riots is the only variable
that changes in the relevant time period, with the changes happening at different times
for different parishes. This strategy would not be feasible with cross-sectional data or with
modern panel data spanning only a few days.
Second, the Swing riots predate the railroads, and the telegraph network had not yet
been properly created. As a result, information had to travel over space by foot, horse-
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back or coach in a spatially continuous way. This enables us to study different mechanisms
through which information about the riots could have spread and caused contagion. In
particular, we examine two local mechanisms, personal contacts and fairs, and two mech-
anisms that operated at the national level, access to newspapers and access to the stage
coach network.
Finally, the rural and local nature of the riots and the restrictions on mobility and
communication that existed at the time allow us to assign parish-specific fundamentals
(size, occupational structure, wealth, connectedness, etc.) to specific riots in a way that is
not possible with modern data. These fundamentals can be treated as exogenous because
they predate the riots and likely remained unchanged in the 40 weeks during which the riots
took place. This enables us to examine which fundamentals influenced whether a parish
experienced a riot, and to quantify the importance of fundamentals relative to contagion.
Our focus on a specific historical event provides us with a credible identification strategy,
but comes at the expense of being specific. However, the role of technological progress in
triggering riots and protests is as salient today as it was in the early nineteenth century:
Caprettini and Voth (2017) have recently established a causal link between the presence of
labor saving machinery and the Swing riots, and so the situation of these rural farm workers
in the early 1830s is not unlike that of current ex-miners in the north of England or factory
workers in the American Midwest. Furthermore, the Swing riots are of substantive historical
importance: at the time they made many people believe that England was on the brink
of revolution (e.g., McCarthy, 1882, p. 69), and Aidt and Franck (2015) demonstrate that
this fear played a critical role in the success of the Great Reform Act of 1832. This reform
was a key step in the development of parliamentary democracy in the United Kingdom,
and in the decades that followed led to important reforms in the support for the poor, trade
policy, working conditions and local government. From this perspective, the Swing riots
may have been amongst the most influential riots in English history.
Our analysis is divided into three parts. In the first part, we exploit the time and
spatial variation in our data to isolate the contagion effect from correlated and contextual
effects. We adopt different strategies to estimate causal coefficients, including focusing on
riot onset (i.e., the first occurrence of a riot in a parish) and using instrumental variables.
We find that contagion is substantial: a one unit increase in the average number of riots
in a parish’s neighborhood nearly triples that parish’s incidence of riots in the following
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week. This is compelling evidence of local information externalities and suggests that local
networks of personal contacts played an important role in the spread of the riots.
In the second part, we examine three possible diffusion mechanisms related to local
and national information externalities. We find evidence that in the weeks following a fair,
parishes near its location experienced a much stronger contagion effect than those that were
farther away. This is further evidence that local information externalities mattered: the
fairs helped to spread information about the riots, working as local information hubs and
facilitating coordination. To study the importance of national information externalities, we
look at whether locations near places that published a local or regional newspaper (which
amongst other things reprinted what appeared in the London newspapers) or near coach
stops (mostly on routes to London) responded to information shocks differently than other
parishes. The evidence for the role of national information externalities is mixed.
In the third part, we study the cross-sectional (spatial) variation in the total riots that
took place in a parish throughout the 40 weeks of the uprising. This cross-sectional analysis
allows us to evaluate the relative importance of contagion (the total number of riots in the
vicinity of a parish) and parish-specific, time-invariant fundamentals. We consider three
groups of observable fundamentals related to demographic and economic conditions, to
the connectedness of the parish to the outside world, and to repression by the authorities.
We find that parishes with many agricultural families and with many traders, craftsmen,
professionals and individuals who frequently petitioned parliament, experienced more riots.
This is consistent with the view held by some historians (e.g., Charlesworth, 1979) that the
presence in the same parish of many rural poor and a vibrant middle class was conducive
to riots, since the former could provide the manpower while the latter could provide the
organizational skills to overcome the collective action problem. We also find strong evidence
of contagion. Combining these results, we find that contagion magnified the impact of a
change in a parish-level fundamental by a factor of 2.65, showing that contagion was the
primary driver of the spatial diffusion of the Swing riots.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
the literature on protest and riots and places our analysis in context of that work. Section
3 introduces the historical background to the Swing riots. Section 4 discusses the data.
Section 5 presents the main results from the spatio-temporal analysis of the data. Section 6
explores several mechanisms through which the riots may have diffused. Section 7 presents
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the results from our cross-sectional analysis. Section 8 offers some concluding remarks,
while the data appendix details the data sources. The supplementary material at the end
of the paper reports additional estimation results.
2 Related literature
Our paper contributes to the vast literature on social conflict, of which rioting is one par-
ticular manifestation. Broadly speaking, theoretical work in this area can be divided into
two strands. The first emphasizes the role of economic, political and social fundamentals in
producing the conditions for social conflict. Low income and poverty, and in particular neg-
ative income shocks, can lower the opportunity cost of participation (Collier and Hoeﬄer,
2004; Miguel et al., 2004; Dorsch and Maarek, 2015; Aidt and Leon, 2016), and an abun-
dant supply of underemployed young people can further increase the likelihood of conflict
(Urdal, 2006; Campante and Chor, 2012a,b). Polarized societies with a small number of
distinct but internally homogeneous groups are also more prone to social conflict (Esteban
and Ray, 1999; Passarelli and Tabellini, 2017). Ethnicity often contributes to this by fos-
tering between-group differences (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol,
2005; Esteban and Ray, 2011; Esteban et al., 2012; Mitra and Ray, 2014; Iyer and Shri-
vastava, 2016). In short, this strand of the literature considers that economic and social
fundamentals, through their effect on each individual’s cost-benefit calculations, are the
root cause of social conflict.
The second strand of the literature emphasizes contagion, bandwagon effects and in-
formation cascades, downplaying the role of fundamentals. The key insight is that indi-
vidual choices are interdependent: an individual’s costs and benefits of participating in a
riot depend critically on how many other individuals participate. The seminal model by
Granovetter (1978) conceptualizes this idea by assuming that individuals have different
thresholds defining how many others must participate before they too decide to join. An
individual’s decision to participate can trigger a bandwagon effect where “instigators” draw
more reluctant “respectable citizens” into participating. Kuran (1989) uses this logic to
explain revolutions and Lohmann (1994) extends the logic in her theory of information
cascades. Barbera and Jackson (2016) points out that public demonstrations and riots are
essential for this process: unlike information sharing on social media, which is effectively
cheap talk, demonstrations and riots are costly signals that help convince individuals that
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the likelihood of success is sufficiently high to make it worthwhile for them to participate.
All these models share the common feature that conflict can be contagious and that small
shocks can trigger waves of riots.
Empirical work has also focused on exploring how fundamentals and contagion can
explain riots.2 It is, however, difficult to distinguish clearly between the two, particularly in
contexts where information travels fast over large distances. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998),
for example, shows that individual characteristics or fundamentals (e.g. the opportunity
cost of time) as well as social conditions (e.g. ethnic heterogeneity in the area) influenced
riot participation in Los Angeles in 1992, but they cannot isolate the contagion effect. We
contribute to the study of the determinants of riots by quantifying the relative importance
of fundamentals and contagion. With recent riot data, fast mobility makes it impossible
to associate the fundamentals of a particular geographical location to the conditions of
those who instigated riots in that locality. In contrast, with historical data from the early
1830s we can capture the conditions of the people living and rioting in particular locations
because short-run mobility was very limited. In this way, we can estimate the effect of a
large range of observable parish-level characteristics.
The theoretical literature briefly summarized above emphasizes that potential rioters
learn about the costs and benefits of participation or about the likelihood of success by
observing the scale of social conflict around them.3 Empirically, this raises questions about
how and through which mechanism this information is transmitted to potential rioters.
In part motivated by the Arab Spring, many recent papers have emphasized the role of
the internet and social media in facilitating coordination (for an overview, see Sabadello,
2012). As discussed in Little (2016), potential rioters must overcome both a political coor-
dination and a tactical coordination problem. The political coordination problem concerns
how many other citizens would be willing to participate in a risky revolt. The tactical
problem concerns where, when, and how to revolt. Mass and social media and the internet
can help overcome the second problem, but not necessarily the first, because information
and communication technologies can spread information both about regime opposition and
support. This theoretical ambiguity is reflected in empirical work. Hassanpour (2014), for
2There is a related literature in sociology (e.g., Andrews and Biggs, 2015).
3Tullock (1971) points out that participation in an uprising (riot or revolution) is motivated by private
benefits and not by the public goods potentially provided if the social aims of the uprising are achieved,
as these will be enjoyed regardless of whether the individual participates. It follows that learning must
therefore be about the private costs or benefits of rioting.
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example, shows how the Mubarak regime’s shutdown of the internet and the mobile phone
network during the Egyptian revolution in 2011 enhanced rather than hindered conflict by
catalyzing local coordination, while Enikolopov et al. (2016) provides causal evidence that
the penetration of VKontakte (the Russian equivalent to Facebook) facilitated the protests
that took place in the wake of the 2011 Russian election. Acemoglu et al. (2014) also
finds that activity on social media helped mobilize protesters (and helped solve the tactical
coordination problem) during Egypt’s Arab Spring. The Swing riots predate modern com-
munication technologies, and because of this allow us to draw a clear distinction between
local information externalities, which are either first-hand and personal within small geo-
graphical areas or through local information hubs like fairs, and national information flows
transmitted with some delay through the national newspapers or along the stage coach
network.
Our paper is closely related to the historiography of the Swing Riots themselves. Many
prominent social historians, including Hammond and Hammond (1912), Thompson (1963),
Hobsbawm and Rudé (1973), Charlesworth (1979), Tilly (1995), Bohstedt (2010), and
Griffin (2012) have written about the riots, often seeing them as an uprising of oppressed
agricultural laborers. In seeking an explanation for why the riots happened and for their
particular geography, this research has emphasized two sets of explanations that put the
spotlight on local factors and, although not articulated in those terms by historians, follow
neatly the theoretical distinction between fundamentals and contagion. For example, Hob-
sbawm and Rudé (1973) and Charlesworth (1979, 1983) argue that local economic (e.g.,
relative deprivation and underemployment) and social (e.g., the presence of local radicals)
factors were important, and that local information externalities operating through per-
sonal contacts or via markets and fairs played a key role in the diffusion of the riots. The
Swing riots have recently been subject to more systematic statistical analysis. Aidt and
Franck (2015) exploit spatial differences in voters’ exposure to the Swing riots to establish
a causal link between the riots and the success of the Great Reform Act, while Caprettini
and Voth (2017) use spatial information about the location of threshing machines, which
were a prime target for the riots, to establish a causal link between the presence of labor
saving machinery and the riots. We add to this literature in two ways. First, unlike these
studies, we explore the temporal as well as the spatial nature of the Swing riots, and this
enables us to examine how the riots diffused and to isolate the contagion effect from other
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drivers. Secondly, while Caprettini and Voth (2017) focus on one particular fundamental
factor and show how it contributed to the riots, we quantify the importance of a broad set
of fundamental factors relative to contagion.
Finally, our work on the Swing riots is also related to the broader literature on the spatial
contagion of violent intra- and inter-state conflict and criminal activity. The large literature
on the spatio-temporal dynamics of inter-state and civil war is fundamentally concerned
with the same broad issues related to fundamental factors versus contagion (see the survey
by Sambanis, 2002); the same is true of the literature on the “war” between competing
Mexican drug trading organizations and its escalation in 2010 (Dell, 2015; Osorio, 2015).
3 Historical background
The Swing riots were a rural uprising that took place during the winter of 1830-31 mainly
in the English countryside.4 According to the riot data compiled by Hobsbawm and Rudé
(1973, Appendix III) and the Family and Community Historical Research Society (Holland,
2005), almost 3000 riots took place. Figure 1 plots the number of riots per week between
June 28 1830 and March 28 1831. The riots started in Kent, gained momentum in August
1830, and peaked in late November. By March 1831 they had returned to their initial low
level. The map in Figure 2 shows the geography of the riots and reveals that they were
concentrated in the cereal-producing areas of the south-east, in the Midlands and in East
Anglia, while the dairy-producing areas in Cornwall, Wales and the north of England were
less affected.
The bulk of the Swing rioters were landless farm laborers who worked for tenant farmers
on daily or weekly wage contracts, supplemented by poor law subsidies from the parish in
which they lived.5 Yet, it is clear from the information about the occupations of the
rioters, reported in Holland (2005), that about 16 percent of the 1270 individuals for whom
4The riots derived their name from the mythical Captain Swing, whose signature could be found on the
threatening letters received by authority figures and others in the affected areas. Some historians (e.g. Well,
1997) have searched for a link between Captain Swing and national radical politicians, such as William
Cobbett (who was accused of starting riots in Kent in October 1830 but later acquitted). However, the
question of national leadership and conspiracy has been investigated and dismissed by many others (see
Halévy (1923, Vol. 3), Hobsbawm and Rudé (1973, Chap. 4), Dyck (1992), Royle (2000, p. 85ff) and Jones
(2009)).
5The agricultural economy comprised four social groups. A small group of large landowners were at the
top of the social pyramid. They rented out relatively large pieces of land to between 225 and 300 thousand
tenant farmers on long-term contracts who, in turn, employed about 1.5 million farm laborers on spot
contracts. The fourth group consisted of craftsmen, artisans, traders and professionals who resided in the
larger villages or small market towns.
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Figure 1: The the number of Captain Swing riots by week, June 1830 to March 1831.
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Sources: Hobsbawm and Rudé (1973, Appendix III) and Holland (2005).
occupation information is available belonged to the class of village craftsmen and traders,
many of whom, unlike the farm laborers, were literate and likely played a role in organizing
riots locally (e.g., Charlesworth, 1979; Well, 1997).
Despite significant out-migration to the expanding industrial centers, rural unemploy-
ment remained high throughout the 1820s, in particular outside the peak season. As a
consequence, many farm laborers and their families lived in extreme poverty, a situation
that was compounded by the adoption of the threshing machine, which took away much
of the farm laborers’ winter employment, and a failed harvest in 1829.6 The demands of
the Swing rioters were economic in nature: higher wages, separation of poor law subsidies
from wage payments, and more work.7 These demands were directed against local tenant
farmers, poor law overseers, parsons, and other local parish officials.
The riots took a number of different forms: burning of barns and ricks (incendiarism),
destruction of threshing machines (machine breaking), robbery and forced levies of money,
assaults on poor law officials, wage and tithe riots which often involved gangs of several
hundred farm workers demanding higher wages or lower taxes from parish officials, and
6There is a significant literature that links riots and protest to adverse economic shocks induced by bad
weather (e.g., Miguel et al., 2004; Chaney, 2013; Jia, 2014; Aidt and Leon, 2016; Harari and La Ferrara,
2014) or by world market price fluctuations (e.g., Dube and Vargas, 2013). While the failed harvest of 1829
arguably contributed to the uprising, any regional variation in weather conditions within the 40 week time
window of the riots is unlikely to have played a role.
7The parish-funded poor law system provided a significant supplement to the wage income of farm
laborers; it also limited out-migration, since those who moved typically lost their right to this aid (Boyer,
1990).
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Figure 2: The spatial distribution of the Captain Swing Riots.
(a) All riots
Notes: The map shows the location of all recorded Swing riots. The spatial unit is a parish and a larger
circle indicates more riots in a given parish.
anonymous threatening letters (Swing letters).8 Table 1 reports the number of occurrences
by type.
The authorities reacted to the riots with a combination of local concessions and re-
pression. The local nature of the demands made by the farm laborers meant that local
resolutions could be found in many cases (see, e.g., the example of Hungerford discussed in
Jones (2009)). The primary responsibility for law and order rested with the landed gentry
or Church of England parsons who served as magistrates or justices of the peace. They
were tasked with the job of restraining and arresting the Swing rioters. However, they had
very few means at their disposal, and relied on volunteers recruited from amongst local
tenant farmers and other local property owners, many of whom were initially reluctant to
serve. As a consequence, there were large differences in the response from the magistrates,
ranging from violent repression in Hampshire and Wiltshire to accommodation in Norfolk.
Nationally, the responsibility for law and order rested with the Home Office, but it too
had few means at its disposal. Outside of London, about 88 Municipal Corporations had
established public police forces by 1830, but the forces were small and set up to police
urban, as opposed to rural, areas (Jones, 1982). The regular army was also small and
8We follow the historiographical literature and refer to these events as riots, acknowledging that some
of them (e.g., the Swing letters) may be better described as instances of protest.
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Table 1: The 12 most common types of Swing riots.
Riot type Number
Arson 1306
Attempted arson 54
Machine breaking (Threshing machines) 538
Machine breaking (other agricultural machinery) 47
Machine breaking (Industrial machines) 35
Sending anonymous threatening letters 270
Robbery 254
Wage riot 289
Tithe riot 67
Rescue of prisoners 102
Damage to crops, fences, etc. 32
Animal maiming 74
Source: Holland (2005).
scattered between the ports, the capital and some of the larger provincial towns. Lord
Wellington’s Tory government, which controlled the Home Office until November 23, 1830,
reluctantly stationed some troops in or near the larger towns in the affected areas (e.g. near
Canterbury and Chatham in Kent) and, in the autumn of 1830, ringed London with 7000
troops, stationed 2000 New Police in Westminster, and hastily filled the Tower of London’s
moat with water in order to forestall an attack (Tilly, 1995, pp. 287-88). When the Whig
government assumed power on November 23, the new Home Secretary, Lord Melbourne,
took more decisive action. The tangible effect was that by December 1830 about 2000 ri-
oters had been arrested and were awaiting trial. A special commission, appointed by Lord
Melbourne and sent to a number of counties in early December, sentenced many of them
to death or deportation.
4 Data and Measurement
The data on the Swing riots were originally compiled by Hobsbawm and Rudé (1973,
Appendix II) and substantially extended by the Family and Community Historical Research
Society (Holland, 2005) and Griffin (2012). Their primary sources were London-based
periodicals, Home Office documents and other official national archival reports, as well
as information from local archives and newspapers. The data record the name of the
parish/township/hamlet and county in which each of the recorded 2818 riots took place,
the day of the riot and, for a subset of them, a short characterization of the nature of
the riot and an estimate of how many individuals were involved. The riot data are almost
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certainly a complete record of the riots that were reported, and although it is likely that
some incidents were not reported at the time, we have no reason to believe that our sample
is unrepresentative. We geo-referenced each riot and aggregated the daily observations by
week. The base unit of analysis is a parish-week pair, covering the 40 weeks between June
28 1830 and April 3 1831 for the 10,335 English parishes.9 For each parish i, we used GIS
software to compute the number of riots that happened in a given week in parishes with
centroids within a 10km radius of parish i’s centroid. In robustness checks, we consider
larger neighborhoods, but the 10km radius, which corresponds to a walking distance of
about 2-3 hours, is a reasonable starting point. Holland (2005, Appendix I) records the
names of 1673 individuals who were arrested and trialed for participating in the riots. From
this we can identify 484 riots where at least one arrest was made by the local magistrates.10
We use this information to distinguish between riots that resulted in at least one arrest and
those that did not. If we assume that the arrests were made within a week of the event, we
can then use this as a measure of local law enforcement.
Data on economic and social fundamentals are drawn from the 1831 Population Cen-
sus of Great Britain and a large number of other primary and secondary sources.11 These
data are recorded at the parish level and are available for up to 10,335 English parishes
or townships. They do not exhibit any time variation over the course of the 40 weeks of
the Swing riots. We divide the parish-specific, time-invariant economic and social funda-
mentals into three categories (see the Data Appendix for precise definitions of the variables
and sources). The first category captures the basic demographic and economic structure
of the parish. This includes census information on the area of the parish (area), the total
population (population), the size of the adult male population (males), and the aggregate
value of real property in 1815 (wealth). We use Caird (1852)’s division of England into
four agricultural regions, along a north-south and an east-west axis, to capture differences
in agricultural production. The north-south axis demarcates the eastern counties domi-
nated by cereal production (mostly grain and wheat) from those in the west dominated
by dairy farming. The east-west line, which runs through Shropshire via Leicestershire to
Lincolnshire, demarcates the relatively high-wage counties in the north from the low-wage
9We have no information on riots in Scotland and do not have data on some of the fundamentals for
Wales. We include Wales in some robustness checks.
10Only one arrest was made in about half the cases, but in a few as many as 40 participants were arrested.
The most common offense was machine breaking, but all the main riot types were represented amongst the
prosecuted cases.
11The information contained in the 1831 Census was collected in May 1831.
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counties in the south. Based on this, we code three indicator variables – High wage,
cereal; Low wage, dairy; and Low wage, cereal – that capture the four agricultural
regions of England.12 We measure the employment structure of a parish by recording the
number of families engaged in agriculture (families in agriculture), the number of tenant
farmers and landowners13 (farmers), and the number of individuals employed in manufac-
turing (manufacturing workers), in trade and handicraft (traders and craftsmen), and
in the professions, e.g., law, medicine or teaching (professionals). The dummy variable
enclosed before 1830 codes the history of enclosure of common land in the parish and
equals one if the parish had enclosed prior to 1830. The enclosure of common land removed
communal rights and converted it into private property (Gonner, 1912; Tate, 1978).
The second category captures how connected the parish was to the outside world. We use
several proxies to capture “connectedness”. First, civic groups or individuals could petition
parliament directly in relationship to local or national issues. The variable petitions,
coded from the Journals of the House of Commons, records the number of petitions between
1828 and 1831 related to the three big issues of the period: slavery, Catholic rights and
parliamentary reform (House of Commons, 1831). Second, the variable marketN records
whether a parish was within a 10km radius of a town with weekly or bi-weekly markets
(Owen, 1827). Third, the variable newspaperN records whether a parish was within a
10km radius of a town that published a local or regional newspaper (House of Commons,
1833). Finally, the variable coachstopN records if a parish was within a 10km radius of a
stop on the stage coach network (Bates, 1969). Being close to a regular market, to where a
newspaper was published or to a coach stop, connected a parish to the outside world and
enabled flows of people and information.
The third category relates to repression, which was mostly left in the hands of the local
magistrates. The effectiveness with which they could respond to riots in a particular parish
likely depended on whether there was an army garrison or a police force nearby. We code
the variables distance to garrison and policeN; the first measures the distance to the
nearest garrison (War Office, 1830), while the second is a dummy that equals 1 if the parish
is located within a 10km radius of a municipal borough with a police force (Clark, 2014).
Tables A1 and A2 in the Data Appendix report the descriptive statistics for these variables.
12The omitted region is High wage, dairy.
13Unfortunately, the 1831 Census includes as landowners many town dwellers with a tiny plot of land for
domestic use, so this variable tends to overestimate the number of individuals who own their own land in
more urban areas.
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5 The spatio-temporal spread of the Swing riots
In this and the following section, we study the diffusion of the riots. We are interested in
two main questions: how important was contagion and can it be separated from contextual
and correlated effects? And through which mechanisms did contagion operate?
The spatio-temporal nature of the Swing riots data allow us to address the two well-
known challenges to the identification of peer effects from a cross-section (Manski, 1993):
we can distinguish between peer effects (endogenous and contextual) and correlated effects,
and we can resolve the reflection problem and distinguish between the source of the peer
effect (endogenous or contextual). This is because the time dimension allows us to model
the temporal order in which the riots spread: the undeveloped state of transport and
communication systems in the 1830s meant that the Swing riots spread relatively slowly,
generating time variation in riot exposure (the endogenous effect) that is observable, but at
the same time fast enough to render all parish-level economic and social fundamentals (the
contextual and correlated effects) approximately fixed. And so our identification strategy
relies on the fact that during the 40 weeks of the Swing riots these fundamentals either
exhibited no time variation, and so can be picked up by parish fixed effects, or that their
variation can be captured with location-specific time trends and week effects. This allows
us to take out the contextual and correlated effects, leaving us only with the endogenous
effect (i.e. contagion).
The units of observation are combinations of the 10,335 English parishes and the 40
weeks between Monday, 28th June 1830 and Sunday, 3rd April 1831. Our baseline specifi-
cation is
riotst = pi + ωtι+
L∑
s=1
βs ×W× riotst−s +
L∑
r=1
λrriotst−r + ut, (1)
where riotst is an n×1 vector where element i corresponds to the number of riots in parish
i in week t, while on the right hand side, pi is an n × 1 vector of parish fixed effects that
capture all time-invariant parish level factors. In the second term, ωt is a scalar week effect
and ι is an n × 1 vector of ones, and these capture time shocks common to all parishes.14
The term
L∑
s=1
βs×W× riotst−s, where βs is a parameter and W is a n×n row-normalized
weight matrix with entries corresponding to parishes with centroids within 10km being
non-zero, and all other entries set to 0.15 Therefore, parish j is considered i’s neighbor if
14We later consider alternative time effects that allow the shocks to vary across space.
15The rows of the matrix add up to 1. If parish i has n neighbors within a 10km radius, then each entry
in row i corresponding to a neighbor carries a weight of 1/n. An alternative is to not row-normalize and
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its centroid is within 10km of parish i’s centroid, and parish i is not considered to be its
own neighbor.16 This term therefore involves time lags of the spatial lag, and captures the
effect of riots in neighboring parishes at different times in the past. The term
L∑
r=1
λrriotst−r
includes time lags of own riots where L is the number of lags and λr is a parameter; this
captures the history of riots within a parish. The term ut is a n× 1 vector of errors, which
includes unobserved factors.
To recap, the assumption needed to isolate the contagion effect is that any correlated
and contextual effects are either (i) fixed at the parish level throughout the duration of the
riots, or (ii) can be picked up by the location-specific time trends or by the week effects.
We estimate equation (1) with the Least Squares Dependent Variable (LSDV) estimator,
adjusting the standard errors to account for spatial correlation between neighboring parishes
(Conley, 1999).17
5.1 Baseline results
Table 2 reports estimation results for equation (1). Columns (1) and (2) show specifications
with one and three temporal lags, respectively.18 Riots in the neighborhood stop being
significant after two weeks and the coefficient estimate changes sign: a riot in a neighboring
parish in week t− 1 increases the expected number of riots at time t, but one in week t− 2
decreases it. Temporal lags of riotst are all significant, with the first lag being positive, but
the lags turning negative after that. This is consistent with the fact that within a parish the
riots were not an explosive process: a parish experienced riots for a few weeks only, after
which the riots moved on to other areas. This is also consistent with the historical context
of the riots; parishes were small places and once a few riots had taken place (the threshing
focus on totals instead. Table A3 in the supplementary material reports the results with this alternative
specification.
16Accordingly, the diagonal entries in W are all set to 0.
17This choice raises three issues. First, the spatial econometrics literature often uses a maximum likeli-
hood estimator to avoid the bias that can arise because of the spatial lag. However, since the spatial lag
in our model is not contemporaneous but enters with a one period lag, this is not an issue, and we can
estimate equation (1) with the simpler LSDV estimator. Second, the presence of a lagged dependent vari-
able can introduce Nickell bias in fixed effects models. The standard solution, which involves using a GMM
estimator such as that developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), assumes that the errors are independent
across the units of observation; a condition that is clearly not satisfied in our data. However, Judson and
Owen (1999) show that the LSDV estimator is the best estimator in situations with more than 30 time
periods, which is the case with our data. Third, the outcome variable – the number of riots in a parish in
a given week – is a count variable. We show some results estimated with a Poisson model that takes this
into account, but prefer the linear model as the baseline as it allows us to correct the standard errors for
spatial correlation.
18Table A4 in the supplementary material reports specifications with up to ten temporal lags.
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machines destroyed, the barns burned, or the local officials coerced into promising higher
wages), there would be few, if any, targets left for new riots.19
The estimates of the coefficient on the first spatial lag W× riotst−1 in columns (1) and
(2) capture the direct impact that an exogenous change in the average number of riots in
the neighboring parishes in week t− 1 has on riots the following week, riotst. They can be
interpreted as marginal effects because the spatial lag enters the panel model with a one
week lag, ensuring that the feedback process between parishes starts with a lag. However,
the interpretation of the marginal effect is complicated by the fact that the matrix W is
row normalized so that the coefficients relate to variation in the average number, and not
in the total number, of riots nearby in the previous week. To get a sense of the magnitude
of the marginal effect, consider the parish of Chilton Foliat in Wiltshire. In the third week
of November 1830, it was exposed to an average of 4.4 riots in its neighborhood. This is the
largest exposure of any parish throughout the uprising. This increases the expected number
of riots in Chilton Foliat in the last week of November by 0.088*4.4=0.38 relative to the
counter-factual of no riots nearby in the previous week. In fact, Chilton Foliat experienced
1 riot throughout the uprising (or an average of 1/40=0.025 riots per week). Compared
to this, the effect of contagion is substantial: it increases the expected number of riots
more than tenfold. Even in a week when there had only been, on average, one riot in the
neighborhood in the previous week, the expected number of riots would more than triple.
The estimate of the coefficient on W× riotst−1 isolates the contagion effect under the
maintained assumption that correlated and contextual effects are picked up by the parish
and week fixed effects. This assumption would be violated if some parishes were affected by
correlated shocks that varied across time and space. Table 2, columns (3) and (4) report
results of augmented versions of equation (1) that replace the common time effects with
time shocks that vary across space. First, we account for economic shocks that might
differ in their impact across locations because of differences in agricultural activity. To this
end, we include the interaction between the indicator for the agricultural region a parish
19For the effect of a riot to disappear over time, we need the coefficient on higher order lags to become
smaller; the fact that they become negative indicates that the reversion to zero is very fast. In order to
understand why the same pattern is expected of the spatial lag, consider a parish that suddenly finds itself
surrounded by riots in its neighborhood. The probability that it experiences a riot goes up, and after the
riots pass through the area the probability falls back down. If that parish experiences no riots during the
period of increased riot activity in its neighborhood (a distinct possibility, since the probability of having
a riot remains below 1), the change in the probability that it experiences a riot cannot be captured by the
lag of the dependent variable (which in all cases will be 0). In these cases, the effect is captured by the
time lags of the spatial lag, explaining why its coefficient turns negative after one week.
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is located in and the week effect. For a correlated shock not to be captured, it must affect
only some parishes within an agricultural region. The results are reported in column (3).
We observe that the coefficient on W × riotst−1 falls from 0.088 to 0.062, but remains
statistically significant at the five percent level. Second, in column (4) we include county
× period dummies. We divide the uprising into four sub-periods, with the period dummies
coded to correspond to each of them. This allows the economic shock to vary at the county
level. The point estimate on W × riotst−1 decreases from 0.088 to 0.074 but remains
very precisely estimated. Overall, the results reported in columns (3) and (4) suggest that
idiosyncratic correlated shocks are not a major concern.
Columns (5) to (7) present three robustness checks. First, the riots started in Kent,
and so the parishes in Kent may have differed systematically from those in the rest of the
country.20 Column (5) reports the results of a specification without these parishes, and
show that our findings are not driven by the inclusion of Kent. Second, parishes close to
London may have been different because of their proximity to the capital.21 Column (6)
shows that this was not the case; dropping all parishes within 20km of London has only
a minimal impact on the results. These checks show that our baseline estimates are not
unduly influenced by the inclusion of potentially special cases in the sample. Third, column
(7) reports the results from using a fixed effects Poisson estimator that treats the number
of riots in a parish as a count variable. The coefficients are different and have a different
interpretation (see the table note), but the signs and significance levels are consistent with
the LSDV results reported in the rest of the table.
We have also investigated the sensitivity of the contagion effect to alternative definitions
of the neighborhood of a parish (reported in Table A5 in the supplementary material). The
contagion effect becomes smaller as we increase the size of the neighborhood, but it remains
highly statistically significant. For example, for a radius of 20km, the coefficients on the
spatial lag corresponding to the specifications in Table 2, columns (1) and (2) are 0.0017 and
0.0018, respectively. This reduction is consistent with local information externalities flowing
through networks of friends and family, and with the externalities created by groups of
20There is no consensus amongst historians as to why the riots started in Kent in August 1830 and not
somewhere else. In fact, this was most likely a coincidence. The situation in Kent in August 1830 was not
worse than in other cereal-producing counties in southeastern England. Hobsbawm and Rudé (1973, Chap.
4) suggest that, if anything made Kent exceptional, it was its close lines of communication with London
and France.
21For example, Do and Campante (2009) argue that riots in the vicinity of the capital city are more
threatening to the government than riots elsewhere, and so may trigger a different response.
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Table 2: Panel results: The contagion effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES riotst riotst riotst riotst riotst riotst riotst
W× riotst−1 0.085 0.088 0.062 0.074 0.072 0.087 0.397
(0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.026)** (0.019)*** (0.029)** (0.029)*** (0.116)***
W× riotst−2 -0.019 -0.031 -0.040 -0.022 -0.019 -1.719
(0.0089)** (0.0097)*** (0.0080)*** (0.0085)*** (0.0090)** (0.358)***
W× riotst−3 -0.0041 -0.011 -0.041 -0.0074 -0.0037 -3.143
(0.0062) (0.0065)* (0.0066)*** (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.538)***
riotst−1 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.024 0.029 -0.344
(0.016)* (0.016)* (0.016)* (0.016)* (0.015) (0.016)* (0.034)***
riotst−2 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.019 -0.016 -0.512
(0.0064)** (0.0064)** (0.0063)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0065)** (0.063)***
riotst−3 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.388
(0.0053)*** (0.0053)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0055)*** (0.0054)*** (0.072)***
Observations 403,065 382,395 382,395 382,395 366,670 372,368 382,395
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 .
Fixed effects Parish Parish Parish Parish Parish Parish Parish
Time effects Weeks Weeks Region x week County x period Weeks Weeks Weeks
Standard errors Conley Conley Conley Conley Conley Conley Bootstrap (50)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson
Note No Kent excl < 20km London
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns (1) to (6), the standard errors are corrected for spatial correlation amongst the
error terms of parishes within 10km of each other (Conley, 1999). In column (3), we include the interaction between the indicator for which agricultural region of
England a parish is located in and the week fixed effects. In column (4), we include the interaction between county and four period dummies, capturing each of
the four sub-periods of the uprising. The coefficients in column (7) are Poisson regression coefficients. They can be interpreted as follows: if in the previous week
a parish had been exposed to one more riot on average in its neighborhood, the difference in the logs of expected counts would increase by 0.397 units in the next
week, while holding all other variables in the model constant.
rioters roaming the countryside becoming less important as the radius of the neighborhood
expands.22
5.2 Reverse causality
The relative short space of time over which the riots spread, together with the observed
variation in their timing, allows us to isolate the contagion effect by keeping the contextual
and correlated effects constant. This, however, does not determine the direction of causality:
a riot in parish i at time t can lead to a riot in parish j at time t+1, but then this riot might
itself lead to a riot in i at t + 2. In this section we follow two complementary strategies
– focusing on riot onset and using instrumental variables – that allow us to go one step
further and give our estimates a causal interpretation.
5.2.1 Riot onset
One way to address the possibility of reverse causality is to focus on the onset rather than
on the incidence of riots in a parish. By definition there can be no reverse causality in this
setting. We follow the literature on civil wars (e.g., Miguel et al. (2004)) and define a new
n× 1 vector riotsOt that measures riot onset, with element i being equal to 0 if by time t
no riot has taken place in parish i, and equal to 1 if the first riot in parish i occurs at time
t. The variable is coded as missing if a riot has occurred at any time prior to t, so that the
parish exits the sample the week after it experiences its first riot. Consequently, it cannot
experience the feedback from the impact its riot has on its neighbors.23
Table 3 presents estimates of the probability of onset as a function of riots in the parish’s
neighborhood. We cannot include lags of own riots in these estimations because their values
are constant and equal to 0 by definition. To allow a direct comparison with the previous
results, Table 3, column (1) shows a specification with riot incidence (the number of riots)
22The area that any group of rioters could cover was limited by how far the less committed rioters were
willing to wander from home. Furthermore, there is no historical evidence of groups of rioters camping out
overnight, which would confine them to a one-day round trip by foot (e.g., Hobsbawm and Rudé, 1973,
p. 212). The most extreme example of a group of roaming rioters comes from Kintbury (located between
the towns of Newbury and Hungerford) in West Berkshire, where a group of men managed to cover about
50km in one day of rioting, but this was an exception (Jones, 2009). It is unlikely that the direct effect
of such roaming groups of rioters can explain much of the contagion effect we observe: the riots started
by any roaming group would be confined to one day, while in the statistical model we look at riots in the
neighborhood in the previous week.
23This is unlike the civil war literature where countries re-enter the sample once they have experienced
an interval without war. We drop a parish after its first riot because we view the Swing riots as a whole as
one single social movement.
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Table 3: The probability of riot onset
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES riotst riotsOt riotsOt
W× riotst−1 0.11 0.064 24.50
(0.030)*** (0.011)*** (2.04)***
W× riotst−2 -0.032 -0.0025 21.91
(0.0087)*** (0.0037) (2.60)***
W× riotst−3 -0.022 0.0027 22.12
(0.0066)*** (0.0025) (2.42)***
Observations 382,395 363,475 20,742
R-squared 0.002 0.002 .
Fixed effects Parish Parish Parish
Week effects Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors Conley Conley Bootstrap (50)
Estimation OLS OLS Conditional FE logit
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns (1) and (2), the
standard errors are corrected for spatial correlation amongst the error terms of parishes within 10km of
each other (Conley, 1999). The vector riotsOt measures riot onset, with element i being equal to 0 if
by time t no riot has taken place in parish i, and equal to 1 if the first riot in parish i occurs at time t.
The variable is coded as missing if a riot has taken place in i at any time prior to t, so that the parish
exits the sample the period after it experiences a riot. Column (3) reports conditional fixed effects logit
coefficients. There is a significant drop in observations in column (3) relative to column (2) because parishes
that experience no riots are dropped.
as the dependent variable but without any lags of own riots. Column (2) reports the results
from a linear probability model of riot onset with parish and week fixed effects. We observe
that the point estimate on W× riotst−1 is roughly half that in column (1). This suggests
that feedback from parish i back to itself through neighboring parishes may be of some
importance. The coefficient in column (2) shows that a one-unit increase in the average
number of riots in parish i’s neighborhood increases the probability of a riot onset in parish
i by 6.4 percent. As a robustness check, column (3) reports conditional fixed effect logit
estimates.24 Although the coefficients are not directly comparable, the results are consistent
with those in column (2).
5.2.2 Instrumental Variables
An alternative way to address reverse causality is through an instrumental variables strat-
egy that aims at isolating exogenous variation in riots in the neighborhood of a parish. Our
strategy is based on the idea that the economic and social fundamentals of a parish affect
the likelihood that riots will take place, but that their impact might vary as the diffusion
24This is arguably a more appropriate estimator for riot onset, but its downside is that it drops all
parishes that experience no riots, considerably reducing the size of the sample.
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process unfolds. In other words, as the riots diffuse, the potential for time-invariant fun-
damentals to trigger riots changes, and our instruments exploit this variation. Specifically,
we instrument the riots that happened in week t in the 10km neighborhood of parish i with
interactions between the socio-economic fundamentals in parish i’s neighbors and period
time dummies.25 The observable fundamentals introduced in Section 4 are fixed through-
out the riot period, but the interactions with the period dummies allow us to use them as
instruments in the fixed effects panel model.
To ensure that the chosen instruments are relevant, i.e., that they can explain the
occurrence of nearby riots, we test which fundamentals are significantly correlated with
the cross-sectional variation in the total number of riots over the 40 weeks of the uprising
(see Table 8). We find nine fundamentals that pass this test: Log area; Low wage,
cereal; Log traders and craftsmen; Log professionals; Log petitions; Log families
in agriculture; Log population; Log males; and policeN. We also need to ensure that
the instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction. Because of the fixed effects, we only exploit
variation over time in each fundamental’s ability to predict riots in parish i’s neighbors. The
exclusion restriction, therefore, is that these interactions have no impact on the increase in
riots in parish i other than through the impact they have on the increase in riots in parish i’s
neighbors. The only fundamental that plausibly satisfies this condition is Log area, which
is essentially a geographic variable with a value that results from administrative decisions
made earlier in history.26 The value of this variable for parish i’s neighbors is unlikely to
have a time-varying effect on riots in parish i other than through the impact it has on those
neighbors. Therefore we use the interactions between the period dummies and Log area
as instruments.
Table 4 presents the 2SLS estimates along with standard test statistics. In column (1),
we consider one spatial lag only and instrumentW×riotst−1 with the interaction between
25 We define the period dummies as follows: we split the 39 weeks that are left after we apply the lag
operator (which results in the observations for the first week being dropped) into three, and define period
1 to equal 1 for weeks 2 to 14 and 0 otherwise; and define period 2 to equal 1 for weeks 15 to 27 and 0
otherwise. The dummy corresponding to the last 13 weeks is the omitted category.
26The problem with the variable Low wage, cereal is that it will be the same for all of the parishes that
are in the same agricultural region. In these cases, the interactions violate the exclusion restriction because
they impact on parish i’s riots directly. The other seven fundamentals violate the exclusion restriction
because they can potentially have a time-varying impact on neighboring parishes. For example, this is the
case for interactions with Log traders and craftsmen, Log professionals and Log petitions, variables
that capture the size of the middle class and the extent of civic activity. The greater these are, the greater
the supply of local leaders (Charlesworth, 1979), and the incentive for these local leaders to help organize
riots in neighboring parishes – independently of whether their own parishes riot – likely increases as the
uprising spreads.
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Table 4: Instrumental variables estimation results
(1) (2)
VARIABLES riotst riotst
W× riotst−1 0.960 1.021
(0.495)* (0.583)*
riotst−1 -0.083
(0.069)
Observations 402,753 402,753
Number of parishes 10,327 10,327
Fixed effects Parish Parish
Week effects Yes Yes
Standard errors Clustered Clustered
Estimation 2SLS 2SLS
Instrumented W× riotst−1 W× riotst−1
Instruments log area × period 1 log area × period 1
log area × period 2 log area × period 2
F-test excluded instruments 16.87 14.95
AP Chi-sq (underid) 33.74 29.91
AP F (weak id) 16.87 14.95
KP rk LM (under id) 33.30 29.59
KP rk Wald F stat (weak id) 16.89 17.15
Hansen J stat (overid test) 0.761 0.658
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard errors are clustered
at the parish level. The instruments for riots that took place within a 10km radius of a parish are the
interactions between Log area and a dummy period 1 that equals 1 during weeks 2 to 14 of the riots and 0
otherwise (the first week is dropped by the lag operation, leaving 39 weeks in total) and a dummy period 2
that equals 1 for weeks 15 to 27 of the riots and 0 otherwise. The null hypothesis in the under-identification
tests is that the endogenous regressor is under-identified. The null hypothesis of the weak identification
tests is that the instruments are weak. The Hansen J test is for the exogeneity of the instrument set; the
null hypothesis is that the set is valid, and so we do not want to reject.
Log area and two period dummies. In column (2), we add a lagged dependent variable.
The coefficient on the spatial lag in both specifications is roughly ten times larger than
that reported in Table 2, column (2). The p-value in column (1) is 0.053. Accordingly, an
exogenous increase of one in the average number of riots in the neighborhood of parish i in
week t− 1 increases the expected number of riots in parish i in week t by between 0.96 and
1.021.
It is likely that there is a fair amount of heterogeneity in how the riots spread. In that
case, the IV estimates have a local average treatment effect (LATE) interpretation: they
capture the impact for those parishes that were induced to riot because of the riots their
neighbors experienced as a result of their fundamentals becoming more conducive to riots as
the Swing riots unfolded. If this subset of parishes was more prone to riots than the average
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parish, then we would expect the coefficients to be larger. This could explain why the IV
estimates are more than ten times the size of those obtained with the LSDV estimator.
6 The mechanisms: Local and national information
flows
The most plausible explanation for the contagion effect we have estimated is information
externalities: potential rioters learned about riots elsewhere and their consequences and
reacted to that information. These externalities could have operated through a number of
different channels. First, information could have spread by word-of-mouth or by observing
other members of the local agricultural economy; these individuals shared strong personal
ties that would have made them perceive this information as being credible. In particular,
information about the arrest of rioters would have sent strong signals about the risks,
while the congregation of individuals at local fairs would have enabled coordination and
information sharing. Second, information externalities may have been created by national
sources (newspapers) or by individuals from outside the parish (travelers). The landless
farm workers who constituted the backbone of the uprising were largely illiterate and so
could not read the newspapers, and they had at best weak ties to the individuals traveling
along the coach network. Consequently, these national information externalities had to
operate through local intermediaries (e.g., local tradesmen or artisans). In this section, we
examine the importance of local and national information externalities.
6.1 Local law enforcement
The Swing riots could have diffused when potential rioters in one parish learned about
the consequences of riots in neighboring parishes through personal contacts (Hobsbawm
and Rudé, 1973, p. 159). In particular, observing or hearing about local rioters being
caught and punished by the authorities may have led potential rioters to revise their beliefs
about the costs of participation, and thus changed the speed of contagion. We can test this
hypothesis by making a distinction between riots that did not lead to any arrests, riotst−1
no arrest, and those that did, riotst−1 arrest. We re-estimate equation (1) with the own
and spatial lag of riots decomposed in this way; Table 5 reports the results. We observe two
things. First, local law enforcement and repression mattered for the riot dynamics within a
parish, helping prevent “repeat riots” in that same parish: if a parish experienced riots that
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Table 5: The role of local law enforcement
(1)
VARIABLES Riots
W× riotst−1 no arrest 0.024
(0.0032)***
W× riotst−1 arrest 0.018
(0.0055)***
riotst−1 no arrest 0.13
(0.028)***
riotst−1 arrest 0.058
(0.041)
Equal own lag (F test) 11.58***
Equal spatial lag (F test) 1.03
Observations 403,065
R-squared 0.006
Parish fixed effect YES
Week fixed effects YES
Standard errors Conley
Estimation OLS
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard errors are corrected
for spatial correlation amongst the error terms of parishes within 10km of each other (Conley, 1999).
riotst−1 arrest is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one riot with an arrest took place in parish i in
week t− 1, and W× riotst−1 no arrest is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one riot with an arrest
took place within a 10km radius of parish i in week t− 1. The two variables for no arrest are coded to be
one if there was at least one riot but there were no arrests. The F-tests for “equal own lag” and “equal
spatial lag” test the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the arrest and no arrest variables are the same.
were not repressed, the expected number of riots the following week would be significantly
higher than they would have been otherwise. However, riots that led to arrests have no
significant effect on riots in the parish the following week. Second, and in contrast to the
effect on “repeat riots”, local law enforcement did not matter for contagion: the coefficients
on the spatial lags – for riots with arrests and riots without arrests – are both positive and
highly significant, and we cannot reject the null that the two coefficients are the same. This
suggests that the local information externalities underlying the contagion process were not
related to information about local repression efforts.
6.2 Fairs as local information hubs
The many fairs that took place throughout England allowed traders, craftsmen, farmers
and farm laborers from the region to congregate and trade. These fairs were the focal
points for the local agricultural economy, and they likely served as local information hubs
where information about recent local events was shared. Those who learned about the riots
in a fair would have brought this news back to the parishes in which they lived.
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To explore this possible source of contagion, we study the effect that fairs had on riots in
surrounding parishes. Owen (1827) reports the location and dates of the fairs. These dates
and locations were set far in advance to coincide with events in the agricultural calendar.27
Although the location of a fair could be related to factors that were also relevant to the
riots, the timing is plausibly exogenous and so this is what we exploit.28 Specifically, we
augment equation (1) by adding the following terms
γfairsNt−1 + φriotsNt−1 × fairsNt−1, (2)
where fairsNt−1 is a n × 1 vector where element i equals 1 if there was at least one fair
within 10km of parish i’s centroid in week t − 1 and 0 otherwise, riotsNt−1 is a n × n
diagonal matrix where entry (i, i) equals 1 if there was at least one riot in a parish within
10km of parish i’s centroid (but excluding riots in parish i itself) and 0 otherwise, and γ
and φ are parameters. For a parish i, the first of these terms is a dummy for whether there
was a fair nearby in the previous week, and the second is the interaction of that dummy
with another dummy for whether there was at least one riot in parish i’s neighborhood in
the previous week. This formulation divides the effect of a fair into two parts on the basis of
whether riots had taken place in parish i’s neighborhood the prior week. This allows us to
test whether having a fair nearby had an impact on riots in areas that had not experienced
riots recently. If that is the case, it suggests that fairs contributed to the riots by enabling
coordination between participants. The interaction term between fairs and riots in the
neighborhood allows us to test whether fairs served as information hubs that disseminated
information about riots that had taken place nearby in the previous week.
Table 6 reports the results. Column (1) shows a specification without the interaction
term. We find that the coefficient on fairsNt−1 is positive and significant. In column (2),
we add the interaction between the fair dummy and the indicator for whether there were
any riots in the vicinity of the parish in the previous week. We find that now only the
interaction term is positive and significant. This suggests that fairs influenced the diffusion
of the riots only in cases where there had already been riots in the vicinity of the parish.
27Unlike markets, which happened on a weekly basis, fairs were not regular. Parishes that held fairs did
so only a few times a year. There is no discernible temporal or spatial pattern to when or where fairs were
held, and there is no evidence of fairs being canceled as a result of the riots. Map M1 in the supplementary
material shows the spatial distribution of fairs.
28We cannot use fairs as instruments for riots in the neighborhood because they do not satisfy the
exclusion restriction that a fair must have an impact on parish i’s riots only through the impact it has on
parish i’s neighbors. This restriction requires an assumption on the extent of the region served by the fair.
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Table 6: The timing of fairs: The mechanisms of diffusion
(1) (2)
VARIABLES riotst riotst
W× riotst−1 0.085 0.075
(0.028)*** (0.027)***
riotst−1 0.030 0.031
(0.016)* (0.016)*
fairsNt−1 0.0028 0.00091
(0.00090)*** (0.00075)
W× riotst−1 × fairsNt−1 0.035
(0.0090)***
Observations 403,065 403,065
R-squared 0.003 0.003
Fixed effects Parish Parish
Week effects Yes Yes
Standard errors Conley Conley
Estimation OLS OLS
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard errors are corrected
for spatial correlation amongst the error terms of parishes within 10km of each other (Conley, 1999).
fairsNt−1 is a n× 1 vector where element i equals 1 if at least one fair occurred within 10km of parish i’s
centroid in week t− 1 and 0 otherwise. riotsNt−1 × fairsNt−1 is a n× 1 vector where entry i equals 1 if
there was at least one riot within 10km of parish i’s centroid and at least one fair within 10km of parish i’s
centroid. We re-estimated the specifications in columns (1) and (2) with three time lags and interactions
(not reported), and the results are consistent with what is reported in this table.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that fairs served as local information hubs.29 To
understand the size of the effect estimated in column (2), suppose that in week t − 1 at
least one riot takes place in the neighborhood of parish i. In the absence of a fair in week
t− 1, the expected number of riots in parish i in week t increases by 0.075. If, on the other
hand, the neighboring riot coincides with a neighboring fair in week t−1, the impact of this
nearby riot is 0.075 + 0.035 = 0.11. Fairs thus had a substantial impact on the magnitude
of contagion.
6.3 Does national information matter?
We have found strong evidence of local information externalities, operating either through
personal ties between people in neighboring parishes or through fairs, and that this had a
considerable impact on contagion. However, it is also possible that national information
externalities contributed to contagion; for example, information about the riots could have
spread through the newspapers. In the early 1830s, national news spread more slowly and
29It is possible that fairs also allowed future rioters to coordinate and organize. Our results cannot rule
out that fairs played both roles, but they do rule out the possibility that coordination was the only role
they played.
27
had a more limited reach than they do today. Information and people traveled along the
roads by foot, horseback or coach as the railroads were yet to be built and the telegraph
was in its infancy. London was the national information hub: all major newspapers were
published there, and the capital was at the center of the coach network. Access to infor-
mation through these networks was not open to the farm laborers: a large fraction of the
rural population was illiterate and could not read newspapers; coach travel was expensive.
If national news reached the farm laborers at all it is likely that it was through village
radicals (belonging to the group of local artisans, traders, etc.). These radicals may have
been motivated by national news about riots to take collective action locally, or simply to
pass on the information to discontented farm laborers.
We code two variables to examine the role of national information in the diffusion
process. They measure two different ways in which parishes were connected to the national
news grid: proximity to a local newspaper and proximity to a coach stop. First, we introduce
a n × 1 vector newspaperN where element i equals 1 if parish i was close (its centroid
was within 10km) of where a local or regional newspaper was printed. At the time, local
and regional newspapers often reprinted material that had previously been published in
the London newspapers, and so we can think of them as spreading national news (Barker,
2000).30 Second, we introduce a n × 1 vector coachstopN where element i equals 1 if
parish i was close (its centroid was within 10km) of a coach stop. In the early 1830s, the
coach network radiated out from London and connected the rest of the country to the
capital (Albert, 1972). Coaches traveled along the existing turnpike roads, making stops
at pre-established locations. Being close to a coach stop would have improved a parish’s
access to national information originating in the London news market.31 If newspapers
or the coach network were important in spreading information about the riots, and that
information triggered new riots, we would expect to see a stronger contagion effect near these
locations. To test this hypothesis, we augment equation (1) with interaction terms between
newspaperN and coachstopN respectively and a n×n diagonal matrix riotsNt−1 where
entry (i, i) equals 1 if there was at least one riot in a parish within 10km of parish i’s centroid
(but excluding riots in parish i itself) in week t − 1, and 0 otherwise. These interaction
terms capture how a parish’s response to riots in its vicinity is affected by its connection
to the national news grid.
30Map M2 in the supplementary material shows the location of the local and regional newspapers.
31Map M2 in the supplementary appendix shows the location of the coach stops.
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Table 7, column (1) reports estimates of the effect of being close to a newspaper: we
find that nearby riots have a much larger impact on the riots in a parish if that parish is
close to a newspaper. To get a sense for the size of this effect, consider a parish i that
has experienced no riots and has seen no riots in its vicinity. If in week t − 1 there is on
average one riot in its neighboring parishes, its expected number of riots in week t increases
by 0.077 if it is not close to a newspaper; if it is near a newspaper, the expected increase in
riots is 25 percent larger, 0.077+0.019 = 0.096. Column (2) reports the effect of proximity
to coach stops. Again, we find that parishes located near coach stops experience a much
stronger contagion effect, this time about 50 percent larger. Together these results show
that nearby riots have a larger impact on parishes connected to the national new grid, which
is consistent with national news facilitating contagion. However, we must bear in mind that
there were only 80 local or regional newspapers, and that the coach network was densest
in the southeast of the country, which is also where the riots started and were most intense
(for reasons unrelated to the coach network). Consequently, it is likely that the connected
parishes were different from the rest. In that case, the effect of proximity to newspapers
and coach stops could be capturing heterogeneity induced by some other factors.
We can probe this issue further by investigating whether important events reported in
the national press had a different impact on connected and unconnected parishes. If the
previous results were solely caused by unobserved heterogeneity, we would not expect this
to be the case. We consider two particular events. The first is the sudden increase in the
number of riots at the end of October 1830. At this point the uprising went from being a
local affair in Kent and assumed national significance with numerous reports in the national
press: the first report about the Swing letters, for example, appeared in the Times on 21
October 1830 under the heading “More outrages in Kent” (Times, 1830). We conjecture
that the acceleration of the uprising was due disproportionally to connected parishes; this
could be, for example, if local organizers had read about the events in Kent in a newspaper
or heard about them at the inns and pubs along the coach network. The second event
is the change in government on November 23 1830.32 As discussed previously, the new
Whig administration took a more hard-line approach to the suppression of the riots than
the previous Tory government: within days of taking control of the Home Office, Lord
32The change in government happened without an election. The Tory party had won a plurality over
the Whigs in the July 1830 election, but divisions among Tory MPs allowed Earl Grey to form a Whig
government when it became clear that the Tories could not continue governing.
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Table 7: National information externalities: Newspapers and coach stops
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES riotst riotst riotst riotst riotst riotst
W× riotst−1 0.077 0.053 0.085 0.084 0.085 0.085
(0.027)*** (0.026)** (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)***
riotst−1 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030
(0.016)* (0.016)** (0.016)* (0.016)* (0.016)* (0.016)*
W× riotst−1 × newspaperN 0.019
(0.0055)***
W× riotst−1 × coachstopN 0.023
(0.0038)***
newspaperN× d (t > 25Oct1830) -0.00036
(0.0010)
coachstopN× d (t > 25Oct1830) 0.0030
(0.00080)***
newspaperN× d (t > 23Nov1830) -0.0015
(0.0012)
coachstopN× d (t > 23Nov1830) -0.0015
(0.00095)
Observations 403,065 403,065 403,065 403,065 403,065 403,065
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Fixed effects Parish Parish Parish Parish Parish Parish
Week effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors Conley Conley Conley Conley Conley Conley
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard errors are corrected for spatial correlation amongst the error terms of parishes
within 10km of each other (Conley, 1999). riotsNt−1 is a n× n diagonal matrix where entry (i, i) equals 1 if there was at least one riot in a parish within 10km of
parish i’s centroid (but excluding riots in parish i itself) and 0 otherwise. newspaperN and coachstopsN are n× 1 vectors with element i set to 1 if there was a
local newspaper or coach stop in the vicinity (within 10km of the centroid) of parish i, respectively. The scalar dummy d (t > 25Oct1830) equals 1 after October 25
1830 and zero otherwise, while the scalar dummy d (t > 23Nov1830) equals 1 after November 23 1830 and zero otherwise.
Melbourne issued a public proclamation offering a reward of £500 for bringing rioters to
justice, and sent letters to the magistrates in the counties instructing them to increase their
efforts to suppress the riots. News about the change in the government’s use of repression
may have made some individuals less willing to organize or participate in riots.
To test this hypothesis, we augment equation (1) with interactions between newspa-
perN and coachstopN, respectively, and a scalar dummy variable d (t > 25Oct1830) that
equals 1 for weeks after the riot acceleration (i.e., the weeks after October 25), and with
a dummy d (t > 23Nov1830) that equals 1 after the change in government (i.e., the weeks
after November 23). Table 7, columns (3) and (4) present the results for the “riot acceler-
ation” shock while columns (5) and (6) present the results for the “change in government”
shock. We find that parishes connected to the coach network played a larger role in the
acceleration of the riots than unconnected ones (column (4)), but proximity to newspaper
appears to play no role (column (3)). We do not find evidence of a different effect on riot
activity between connected and unconnected parishes in the weeks after the Whig govern-
ment assumed office; the point estimates in columns (5) and (6) are negative as expected
but not statistically significant.33 These results provide limited or at best mixed support
for the hypothesis that national information, transmitted by local and regional newspapers
or along the coach network, facilitated diffusion.
7 Fundamentals or contagion?
The panel analysis in Section 5 establishes that contagion, fueled mainly by local informa-
tion externalities, was important for the spatio-temporal diffusion of the riots. However,
it cannot establish the importance of parish-specific, time-invariant fundamentals – demo-
graphic and economic factors, factors related to the connectedness of the parish to the
outside world, and factors related to repression – relative to contagion.34 The Swing riots
offer a unique opportunity to examine this issue. The socio-economic fundamentals of a
parish measure the economic and social conditions of its inhabitants, and it would have
largely been these same individuals who were responsible for the riots recorded in that
parish. This is because travel at the time was slow and forms of transport other than
33The results are largely the same when we restrict the analysis to a three-week window before and after
these news.
34The panel model cannot address this question because the fundamentals get absorbed into the fixed
effects.
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walking were not open to the agricultural laborers who were the main participants in the
riots. Therefore, our historical data allow us to associate the socio-economic conditions of
a parish with the circumstances of the individuals rioting in that parish, something that
cannot be done with recent riots data.35 Since the fundamentals exhibited no time variation
during the 40 weeks of the uprising, we must abstract from the timing of the riots and turn
our attention to the cross-sectional variation in the total number of riots experienced by
different parishes during the whole duration of the uprising. This amounts to changing the
unit of analysis from the parish-week to the parish, of which there were 10,335 in England.
The baseline specification is
riots = αι+ β1 ×W× riots+ fundamentals× γ + county× δ + u, (3)
where riots is a n × 1 vector where n is the number of parishes and riotsi refers to the
total number of riots in parish i between Monday, 28th June 1830 and Sunday, 3rd April
1831. On the right hand side, the first term includes a scalar α and a unit vector ι of
length n. The second term includes the scalar β1, the n× n row-normalized weight matrix
W with non-zero entries corresponding to parishes with centroids within 10km of each
other, and all other entries set to 0.36 This is the spatial lag, and for a parish i it records
the riots happening in parishes within 10km, capturing the contagion effect. The matrix
fundamentals has dimension n × k where k is the number of fundamentals, with row i
corresponding to the fundamentals for parish i, while γ is a vector of length k with entries
corresponding to the coefficients on the fundamentals. We consider the 19 parish-specific
factors, related to demographic and economic conditions, to the connectedness of the parish
to the outside world, and to repression, that we introduced in section 4. The matrix county
has dimension n × c where c is the number of counties, with element (i, j) being equal to
1 if parish i is in county j and 0 otherwise, while δ is an c × 1 vector with the county
fixed effects. The error is given by the n × 1 vector u. Equation (3) is a standard spatial
autoregressive model. The estimation of this model requires that we address the two well-
known challenges to the identification of peer effects from a cross-section (Manski, 1993):
first, we need to distinguish between peer effects (contagion and contextual effects) and
correlated effects, and second, we need to resolve the reflection problem and distinguish
35There is, for example, evidence that in the 2011 London riots individuals traveled to the riot locations,
with the implication that the fundamentals in those locations did not correspond to those of the rioters.
36The diagonal entries are all set to 0, so that a parish is not its own neighbor.
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between the source of the peer effect (contagion or contextual). Many important correlated
effects (such as shared characteristics between clusters of parishes or exposure to common
law enforcement shocks) are picked up by the county fixed effects; in section 7.2 we return
to the question of how to separate contagion from the contextual effect.37
We conduct the analysis in three parts. First, we investigate the parish-specific correlates
of the riots in the absence of contagion. Second, we estimate equation (3) restricting
attention to the fundamentals that we found to be significantly correlated with the riots and
address the reflection problem. Third, we use these estimates to quantify the importance
of the fundamentals relative to contagion.
7.1 The parish-specific correlates of the riots
To gain a better understanding of the correlation between the parish-specific fundamentals
and the total number of riots in a parish, we begin by estimating a restricted version of
equation (3) with β1 = 0. This allows us to estimate the effect of each observable funda-
mental in the absence of contagion and to isolate the ones that are statistically significant.
Table 8 presents the results. The specification in column (1) is estimated using OLS and
the standard errors are corrected for spatial correlation, while the specification in column
(2) is estimated using a Poisson estimator that takes into account the count nature of our
riots data.38 Both specifications include county fixed effects so that we exploit variation in
parish fundamentals relative to the within county average. The observable fundamentals
can explain 17 percent of the within county spatial variation in riots (column (1)).
With respect to the individual parish-level fundamentals, we observe the following.
First, larger parishes experienced more riots. The same was true for parishes located in the
low wage, cereal-producing region of England, and for those with more families employed in
agriculture. This is to be expected, as most Swing rioters belong to this group of landless
farm workers and were concentrated in the cereal-producing areas. In contrast, we observe
that the enclosure of common land before 1830, contrary to the conjecture by Hammond
37The fact that our “reference group” for parish i – the parishes within a 10km radius of its centroid – is
defined on a spatial basis, introduces non-linearities into the specification through the weighting matrix W.
This makes it easier to separately identify the contagion and contextual effect (Brock and Durlauf, 2001;
Bramoullè et al., 2009; Blume et al., 2011).
38In studies of conflict, the negative binomial is regularly used to account for the fact that the mean and
variance of the outcome variable are usually different, as is the case in our data. However, the Poisson
conditional fixed effect ML estimator that we use is robust to the violation of this restriction, making the
use of a negative binomial estimator unnecessary. We implement this using the ppml command in Stata
(see Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)).
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Table 8: The parish-specific correlates of the riots
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Riots Riots
Demographic & economic
Log area 0.11 0.46
(0.027)*** (0.12)***
Log population 0.12 1.21
(0.090) (0.70)*
High wage, cereal 0.071 0.16
(0.045) (0.41)
Low wage, dairy -0.070 -0.58
(0.068) (0.56)
Low wage, cereal 0.41 0.55
(0.16)*** (0.58)
Log families in agriculture 0.037 0.20
(0.022)* (0.077)***
Log farmers -0.0034 -0.066
(0.022) (0.089)
Log manufacturing workers -0.012 0.0075
(0.0097) (0.039)
Log traders and craftmen 0.049 0.22
(0.016)*** (0.090)**
Log professionals 0.040 0.0030
(0.013)*** (0.075)
Log males -0.14 -1.16
(0.096) (0.69)*
Enclosed before 1830 -0.0068 0.098
(0.023) (0.088)
Log wealth -0.021 -0.16
(0.026) (0.10)
Connectedness
MarketN 0.0012 0.0057
(0.034) (0.16)
CoachstopN -0.011 -0.12
(0.030) (0.11)
Log petitions 0.083 0.091
(0.035)** (0.10)
NewspaperN -0.028 -0.059
(0.033) (0.16)
Repression
Log distance to garrison 0.0053 0.12
(0.026) (0.11)
PoliceN 0.053 0.26
(0.030)* (0.097)***
Observations 9,491 9,491
R-squared 0.17
Fixed effects County County
Standard errors Conley Cluster by County
Estimation OLS Poisson
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants not reported. In column
(1), the standard errors are corrected for spatial correlation amongst the error terms of parishes within
10km of each other (Conley, 1999) and in column (2), which reports results from a Poisson estimator, they
are clustered at the county level. The unit of observation is the parish, and Riots measures the total
number of riots in a parish during the 40 weeks of the Swing riots. All specifications include county fixed
effects. The coefficients in column (2) can be interpreted as follows: for a one unit increase in the right
hand side variable, each coefficient captures the difference in the logs of expected counts.
and Hammond (1912), did not play a role.39 We also observe that variations in property
valuations (wealth) did not matter despite the fact that this was the tax base upon which
the poor law taxes were levied.
Second, we observe that parishes near coach stops, newspapers publishers or markets
did not experience more riots than other parishes in their county. These factors, therefore,
did not have a direct effect on the riots, but we know from the study of local and national
information externalities in section 6 that they did play a role in their diffusion. The
only variable related to the connectedness of a parish to the outside world that correlates
(positively) with riots is the number of petitions sent to parliament. In combination with
the positive correlation between the total number of riots and the population of traders,
craftsmen and professionals in a parish, this suggests that village-level radicalism may have
played a role. As emphasized by Charlesworth (1979), it was the craftsmen, artisans and
traders with radical sympathies and knowledge of what was going on in the wider world
who possessed the organizational skills to resolve the collective action problem and mobilize
the local farm laborers to riot.
Third, we observe that of the two factors related to repression – closeness to a garrison
(distance to garrison) or to a policy force (policeN) – only closeness to a police force
correlates with the total number of riots.40 However, this correlation is positive; if these
forces played a systematic role in repressing the uprising the coefficient should have been
negative.
7.2 Fundamentals, contextual effects and contagion
The presence of a spatial lag in equation (3) implies that OLS estimates will be bi-
ased and inconsistent, since the spatial lag is mechanically correlated with the error term
(Anselin, 1998). To eliminate this source of bias, we estimate the equation with the
spatial 2SLS estimator developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998). This estimator instru-
ments the spatial lag with three vectors of variables, fundamentals, W× fundamentals,
W2 × fundamentals, where W is the weight matrix, W2 is the second spatial lag, and
fundamentals is a vector of the nine fundamentals which were found to be significant in at
least one of the specifications reported in Table 8. The intransitive nature of our network,
39This is perhaps not surprising as Shaw-Taylor (2001) has demonstrated that in many places the poor
did not enjoy communal rights prior to enclosure, and so had little to lose from the process.
40Map M3 in the supplementary material shows the location of the police stations and the garrisons.
35
Table 9: Diffusion of the Swing riots: Contextual effects and contagion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Riots Riots Riots Riots
W× riots 0.92 0.73 0.49 0.92
(0.045)*** (0.050)*** (0.062)*** (0.037)***
Observations 10,309 10,309 10,042 10,309
Dummies County County County County
Fundamentals No Yes Yes Yes
Contextual effects No No No Yes
Standard errors Spatial Spatial Clustered Spatial
Estimation SHAC SHAC Poisson SHAC
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The unit of observation is the
parish, and Riots measures the total number of riots in a parish during the 40 weeks of the Swing riots.
For a parish i, W× riots refers to the average number of riots across parishes within 10km of its centroid
(excluding riots that happened in i itself). The fundamentals include those that were statistically significant
in at least one of the specifications reported in Table 8, column (1) or (2): Log area, Log population,
Low wage, cereal, Log families in agriculture, Log traders and craftsmen, Log professionals,
Log males, Log petitions and policeN. The coefficients in column (3) are Poisson regression coefficients,
estimated using the glmmboot (glmmML) command in R. The coefficients can be interpreted as follows:
for a one unit increase in the right hand side variable, each coefficient captures the difference in the logs
of expected counts. Column (4) shows a specification with contextual effects. This allows the average
of each of the nine fundamentals in the parishes within 10km to influence riots in parish i. Table A6 in
the supplementary material reports the coefficients for these contextual effects. The SHAC estimator used
to estimate the coefficients in columns (1), (2) and (4) is implemented with the sphet package in R (see
Piras (2010)), using a row-normalized weight matrix where parishes within 10km (Euclidean distance) are
considered neighbors. The standard errors reported in these columns are robust to heteroskedasticity and
spatial correlation.
where i and j can be neighbors, j and k can be neighbors, but i and k will often not be, is a
sufficient condition to ensure that this instrument set is valid and informative.41 We use the
SHAC version of this estimator, which adjusts the spatial 2SLS errors for heteroskedasticity
of unknown form and for spatial autocorrelation (Kelejian and Prucha, 2007).
Table 9, columns (1) and (2) report SHAC estimates of β1. Column (1) shows a speci-
fication without any of the fundamentals included (i.e. setting γ = 0 but including county
fixed effects), while column (2) shows a specification with the nine fundamentals. Column
(3) reports maximum likelihood Poisson estimation results that take into account that the
left-hand side variable is a count variable. The coefficient on the spatial lag is positive and
highly significant in all cases: the total number of riots in a parish are positively associated
with the total number of riots nearby, showing that riots cluster in space. The fact that
the point estimates on the spatial lag are relatively insensitive to whether fundamentals are
included, suggests that the spatial lag and the fundamentals pick up different aspects of
the data generating process.
The baseline spatial autoregressive model in equation (3) does not include spatial lags
of the fundamentals. This is equivalent to assuming that parish j’s fundamentals have no
direct impact on the riots in parish i, ruling out contextual effects. If this assumption does
not hold, e.g., because farm laborers from a deprived parish destroy threshing machines in a
wealthier parish nearby, then the coefficient on the spatial lag will confound the contextual
effect and contagion.42 To address this problem, we add a set of variables to equation (3)
that account for the contextual effects,
W× fundamentals× ρ, (4)
where the weight matrix W has dimension n × n and is row-normalized so that the sum
of entries in any row j adds to 1. The entries corresponding to parishes within 10km
of each other are non-zero, while all other entries are set to zero. Importantly, the fact
41More specifically, the exogenous variation is contained in W2 × fundamentals, since the other two
instruments are the fundamentals and the contextual effects. For this instrument to bring information
that is not already included in the specification, it must be that some of the links it contains are not
included already. A sufficient condition for this is that not all second degree neighbors (i.e. neighbors of
neighbors) are themselves neighbors. This is equivalent to requiring that the network exhibit some degree
of intransitivity.
42To see why, consider a parish j that is within 10km of parish i. Parish j’s fundamentalsj will be
correlated with its riotsj , which in turn enter into the specification for riotsi. If fundamentalsj need to
be included in the specification for riotsi but are omitted, they will be part of the error term, inducing
correlation between riotsj and the error.
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that the weight matrix is row-normalized implies that it averages the nine fundamentals
across neighboring parishes. The vector ρ has length k = 9 and contains the coefficients
on the contextual effects. Column (4) reports the results: the coefficient on the spatial
lag is unaffected and the contextual effects are mostly insignificant.43 This suggests that
contextual effects were unimportant in the diffusion of the riots, a fact that bolsters the
credibility of the instrumental variables strategy adopted in Section 5.2.2.
7.3 The relative importance of fundamentals and contagion
The interpretation of the coefficients on the spatial lag and on the fundamentals is not
straightforward, as they cannot be interpreted as marginal effects. To see why, consider
increasing the variable riotsi by one unit. This has an impact on riotsj, which in turn
has an impact on riotsi, since the latter is itself a function of the former. Consequently,
in order to estimate the total impact from a one unit change in riotsi, we need to work
through the whole chain of effects. To do this, we solve equation (3) for riots to get
riots = N (αι) +N (fundamentals× γ) +N (county× δ) +Nu (5)
where
N = (I− β1W)−1 . (6)
An exogenous riot is a riot that is unexpected from the point of view of this system, and
so it enters through a one unit increase in an element of the error vector, say ui if the
unexpected riot happens in parish i. This impacts on riots in parish i directly, and these
riots then impact on riots in parish i’ neighbors, which in turn impact on riots amongst their
own neighbors including parish i, and so on. These connections are captured by the matrix
N. In particular, column i captures the impact of a shock to ui, where Nj,i is the total
impact on parish j. Therefore, the sum of the elements in column i corresponds to the total
impact of an unexpected riot in parish i (a shock to ui). The size of this impact depends
on which parish the shock hits, since connectivity affects its diffusion: different columns
have different totals, corresponding to the different impact riots in different parishes have
throughout the system. Figure 3 summarizes this information by presenting the distribution
of column totals (based on the SHAC coefficients in Table 9, column (2)). The distribution
has a mean of 3.65, a median of 3.67, and a standard deviation of 0.44, with a maximum
43Table A6 in the supplementary material reports the estimates for ρ.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the total impact (i.e. total increase in riots) that results from a one unit
increase in an element in u.
Note: The column totals are calculated from the SHAC estimates reported in Table 9, column (2).
impact of 5.30. To interpret these estimates, consider the average parish: the total impact
of an exogenous riot in this parish is 3.65, which can be decomposed into a direct impact
of 1 and an indirect impact of 2.65 due to contagion.
How does this compare to the impact of fundamentals? The fundamentals in parish
i have a direct impact on riots in parish i, but they also indirectly have an impact on
riots in other parishes through the feedback process just described. This indirect effect is
conceptually contagion originating from parish i’s riots, and so it makes sense to compare
the direct impact of fundamentals to that of the contagion that follows.44 It is possible then
to imagine an exogenous one unit increase in fundamental k in a parish i and assess its
effect on the total number of riots throughout the system. From equation (5), we observe
that the term N (fundamentals× γ) captures the effect of the fundamentals. The total
impact of this one unit increase is then given by [N1,i + ...+Nn,i]× γk; that is, the sum of
all the entries in column i of N captures the total effect (as before), but now we have to
multiply that effect by γk since this coefficient scales the unit change in that fundamental.
For example, a shock to fundamental k (e.g., more petitions) in the parish with the average
column total will generate a total riot effect equal to 3.65×γk, of which γk is the direct effect
and 2.65× γk is the result of contagion. In conclusion, the average effect due to contagion
is 2.65 times the size of the direct effect of an exogenous change in a fundamental.
44In principle, it is possible that fundamentals in parish i affect riots in j directly. However, Table 9,
column (4) and Table A6 in the supplementary material show that contextual effects are largely absent.
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8 Conclusions
We use data from a specific episode of social unrest, the Swing riots of 1830-1831, to study
how people overcome the collective action problem associated with organizing riots, and
in doing so examine the mechanisms that can turn an initially small event into a major
uprising. More specifically, we address two related issues. First, we isolate contagion from
other social interaction effects and investigate the specific mechanisms that may have driven
this contagion, focusing on the importance of local and national information externalities.
Second, we examine the correlates of the riots, with a particular focus on the importance of
economic and social fundamentals relative to contagion. The Swing riots provide an ideal
setting in which to address these issues: they allow us to assign fundamentals to each specific
riot event, and the relatively slow speed of their spread enables us to distinguish between
contagion (the endogenous effect) and the fundamentals (the contextual and correlated
effects). We find that contagion was more important than the fundamentals in generating
riots, with the impact of a one unit increase in a fundamental magnified by a factor of 2.65
by contagion. This contagion was mostly due to local information externalities between
people in neighboring parishes or between participants at local fairs.
Are the lessons from the Swing riots still valuable today in a world where mass (e.g.,
Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Crabtree et al., 2015) and social media (e.g., Hassanpour, 2014;
Little, 2016; Sabadello, 2012; Lotan et al., 2011) play a leading role in all episodes of mass
protest and social disorder? We believe that they are, particularly in light of recent evidence
showing that online media links are largely geographic in nature and between people who
live in close physical proximity to each other.45 This work suggests that although the
technology has changed, causing the diffusion process to speed up, the underlying social
forces behind this process – geographically localized interactions between trusted friends and
relatives – may have remained largely unchanged. Furthermore, the role of technological
progress in triggering collective violence and protests is as salient today as it was at the time
of the Swing riots. For example, the current situation of ex-miners in the north of England
and factory workers in the American Midwest is not unlike that of the rural farm workers
who were made redundant by the adoption of the threshing machine in 1830s England, as
45For example, Liben-Nowell et al. (2005) shows that up to 69 percent of listed friends on the LiveJournal
online network are geographic in nature.
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demonstrated by Caprettini and Voth (2017). The Swing riots provide us with valuable
lessons that can help inform our response to the most recent incarnation of these challenges.
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A Data Appendix (for publication)
This appendix provides definitions of all the variables used in the analysis and lists the
sources used to construct them.
A.1 GIS datasets
The following GIS datasets have been used to construct the dataset used in the estimations:
1. Wrigley, E.A., Shaw-Taylor, L., and Newton, G., (2010). 1831 Census Report of
England: County Parish Occupations. This dataset was produced with funding from
the ESRC, The Occupational Structure of Nineteenth Century Britain, RES 000-23-
1579. For details of the dataset Wrigley, E.A., The Early English Censuses, British
Academy, Records of Economic and Social History (Oxford, 2011)
2. Satchell, A.E.M., Boothman, L., Shaw-Taylor, L., and Bogart, D., (2016). Par-
liamentary Enclosure Dataset. This dataset was produced with funding from the
Leverhulme Trust, Transport, Urbanization and Occupational Structure 1670-1911,
RPG-2013-093.
3. Shaw-Taylor, Broad, J., and Newton, G., (2016). The 1815 Return of Real Property
for England and Wales. This dataset was produced with funding from the Leverhulme
Trust, Transport, Urbanization and Occupational Structure 1670-1911, RPG-2013-
093.
4. Shaw-Taylor, L., Satchell, A.E.M., and Newton, G., (2016). The Cambridge Group
England and Wales Towns Database. This dataset was produced with funding from
the Leverhulme Trust, Transport, Urbanization and Occupational Structure 1670-
1911, RPG-2013-093.
5. Satchell, A.E.M., Shaw-Taylor, L., and Potter, E., (2016). The Cambridge Group
England and Wales Town Points Dataset. This dataset was produced with funding
from the Leverhulme Trust, Transport, Urbanization and Occupational Structure
1670-1911, RPG-2013-093.
6. Satchell, A.E.M, Newton, G., Bogart, D., and Shaw-Taylor, L., (2014). Bates, Direc-
tory of stage coach services 1836. This dataset and associated shapefile were created
from Bates, A., Directory of stage coach services 1836 (1969). This dataset was
produced with funding from the Leverhulme Trust, Transport, Urbanization and Oc-
cupational Structure 1670-1911, RPG-2013-093, with funding from the Leverhulme
Trust.
7. Satchell, A.E.M., Kitson, P.M.K., Newton, G.H., Shaw-Taylor, L., and Wrigley E.A.,
(2016). 1851 England and Wales census parishes, townships and places (2016). This
dataset was created with funding from the ESRC (RES-000-23-1579), the Lever-
hulme Trust and the British Academy. A description of the dataset can be found
in Satchell, A.E.M., England and Wales census parishes, townships and places: doc-
umentation (2016, 2006) available at: http://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects
/occupations/datasets/documentation.html.
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8. Satchell, A.E.M, Shaw-Taylor, L., and Wrigley E.A., (2016). 1831 England and
Wales ancient counties GIS. This dataset was created with funding from the ESRC
(RES-000-23-1579), the Leverhulme Trust and the British Academy. A description
of the dataset can be found in Satchell, A.E.M., England and Wales ancient counties
1831 documentation (2016, 2006) available at: http://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/research
/projects/occupations/datasets/documentation.html
A.2 Definition of variables and sources
We use the following notation in the definitions of the variables below: (i) i = 1, 2, ...., n is
the index for parishes where n is the total number of parishes; (ii) t is the index for weeks;
and (iii) N at the end of a variable name refers to the “neighborhood” of a parish defined
as parishes within a radius of 10km from its centroid.
The following variables have both cross-sectional and time variation during the 40 weeks
of the riots (between June 28 1830 and April 3 1831):
• riotst is an n× 1 vector where element i corresponds to the number of riots recorded
in parish i in week t. Source: Hobsbawm and Rudé (1973, Appendix II) and Holland
(2005). Geo-referenced using Satchell, Kitson, Newton, Shaw-Taylor, and Wrigley
(2016).
• W× riotst−1 is an an n× 1 vector where element i corresponds to the total number
of riots that took place in week t−1 in parishes with centroids within a 10km radius of
parish i’s centroid. Source: constructed from Hobsbawm and Rudé (1973, Appendix
II) and Holland (2005). Geo-referenced using Satchell, Kitson, Newton, Shaw-Taylor,
and Wrigley (2016).
• riotst−1 arrest is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one riot with an arrest took
place in parish i in week t− 1. riotst−1 no arrest is coded in the same way for riots
where no arrests were made. Source: Holland (2005, Appendix I). Geo-referenced
using Satchell, Kitson, Newton, Shaw-Taylor, and Wrigley (2016).
• W×riotst−1 arrest is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one riot with an arrest
took place within a 10km radius of parish i in week t − 1. W × riotst−1 no arrest
is coded in the same way for the riots where no arrests were made. Source: Holland
(2005, Appendix I). Geo-referenced using Satchell, Kitson, Newton, Shaw-Taylor, and
Wrigley (2016).
• fairsNt is an n × 1 vector where element i is equal to 1 if a parish is ‘exposed’
to a fair in week t; a parish is exposed to a fair if there is one in a parish with a
centroid that is within 10km of its own centroid. The information on fairs comes
from Owen (1827), which contains a directory of fairs in England and Wales in 1827.
Geo-referenced using Shaw-Taylor, Satchell, and Newton (2016) and Satchel, Shaw-
Taylor, and Potter (2016).
• d(t>25Oct1830) is a scalar dummy that equals 1 if t refers to a week that starts on
or after October 25 1830 and 0 otherwise. Source: own coding.
• d(t>23Nov1830) is a scalar dummy that equals 1 if t refers to a week that starts on
or after November 23 1830 and 0 otherwise. Source: own coding.
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The following variables only have cross-sectional variation during the 40 weeks of the
riots.
• riots is an n × 1 vector where element i is the total number of riots in parish i
between Monday, 28th June 1830 and Sunday, 3rd April 1831. Source: Hobsbawm
and Rudé (1973, Appendix II) and Holland (2005). Geo-referenced using Satchell,
Kitson, Newton, Shaw-Taylor, and Wrigley (2016).
• W× riots is an n × 1 vector and W is a n × n row-normalized weight matrix with
non-zero entries corresponding to parishes with centroids within 10km of each other,
and all other entries set to 0. Parish i is not considered to be its own neighbor.
The variable captures the average riots in a 10km neighborhood of a parish. Source:
constructed from Hobsbawm and Rudé (1973, Appendix II) and Holland (2005). Geo-
referenced using Satchell, Kitson, Newton, Shaw-Taylor, and Wrigley (2016).
• Log area is an n × 1 vector where element i is the natural logarithm of the area in
English statute acres of parish i. Calculated from Satchell, Kitson, Newton, Shaw-
Taylor, and Wrigley (2016).
• Log population is an n × 1 vector where element i is the natural logarithm of the
total number of inhabitants in parish i in 1831 (in 1000s). Source: Census of Great
Britain, 1831. Wrigley, Shaw-Taylor and Newton (2010).
• High wage, cereal is an n×1 vector and High wage, cereali is a dummy variable
equal to one if parish i is located in the high wage cereal growing regions of England,
i.e. the northeast of England. Source: Caird (1852).
• Low wage, cereal is an n× 1 vector and Low wage, cereali is a dummy variable
equal to one if parish i is located in the low wage cereal growing regions of England,
i.e. in the south-east and East Anglia. Source: Caird (1852).
• Low wage, dairy is an n × 1 vector and Low wage, dairyi is a dummy variable
equal to one if parish i is located in the low wage dairy farming regions of England, i.e.
in Cornwall, the southwest of England, or parts of Wales and the Midlands. Source:
Caird (1852).
• High wage, dairy is an n× 1 vector and High wage, dairyi is a dummy variable
equal to one if parish i is located in the high wage dairy farming regions of England,
i.e. the northwest of England. This is the omitted category in the regression analysis.
Source: Caird (1852).
• Log families in agriculture is an n × 1 vector where element i is the natural log-
arithm of the number of families chiefly employed in agriculture in parish i. Source:
Census of Great Britain, 1831; Wrigley, Shaw-Taylor and Newton (2010).
• Log farmers is an n×1 vector where element i is the natural logarithm of the number
of male agricultural occupiers (tenant farmers or landowners) aged 20 or over in parish
i. Source: Census of Great Britain, 1831; Wrigley, Shaw-Taylor and Newton (2010).
• Log manufacturing workers is an n × 1 vector where element i is the natural
logarithm of the number of males aged 20 or over employed in manufacturing or in
making manufacturing machinery in parish i. Source: Census of Great Britain, 1831;
Wrigley, Shaw-Taylor and Newton (2010).
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• Log traders and craftmen is an n×1 vector where element i is the natural logarithm
of the number of males aged 20 or over employed in trade or in handicraft as masters
or workmen in parish i. Source: Census of Great Britain, 1831; Wrigley, Shaw-Taylor
and Newton (2010).
• Log professionals is an n × 1 vector where element i is the natural logarithm of
the number of males aged 20 or over classified as capitalists, bankers, professionals
and other educated men in parish i. Source: Census of Great Britain, 1831; Wrigley,
Shaw-Taylor and Newton (2010).
• Log males is an n× 1 vector where element i is the natural logarithm of the number
of males aged 20 or over in parish i. Source: Census of Great Britain, 1831; Wrigley,
Shaw-Taylor and Newton (2010).
• enclosed before 1830 is an n × 1 vector where element i is equal to one if parish
i was affected by any enclosure acts dated 1830 or earlier, and 0 otherwise. Source:
Tate (1978); Satchell, Boothman, Shaw-Taylor, and Bogart (2016).
• Log wealth is an n× 1 vector where element i is the natural logarithm of the annual
value of real property in parish i (as assessed in April 1815). Source: Census of Great
Britain 1831. (1831 (348) Population. Comparative account of the population of
Great Britain in the years 1801, 1811, 1821, and 1831) and Shaw-Taylor, Broad, and
Newton (2016).
• marketN is an n × 1 vector where element i is equal to one if parish i was located
within a 10km radius of a weekly or bi-weekly market. The information on markets
is from Owen (1827), which contains a directory of regular markets in England and
Wales in 1827. Geo-referenced using Shaw-Taylor, Satchell, and Newton (2016) and
Satchel, Shaw-Taylor, and Potter, (2016).
• coachstopN is an n× 1 vector where element i is equal to one if parish i was within
10km of a stop on the stage coach network. The information on the location of the
coach stops comes from Bates (1969), which contains a timetable and a directory for
the stage coach services in 1836. Geo-referenced using Satchell, Newton, Bogart, and
Shaw-Taylor (2014).
• Log petitions is an n×1 vector where element i is the natural logarithm of the number
of petitions originating from parish i and submitted to the House of Commons between
1828 and 1831. The petitions were related to abolition of slavery, parliamentary
reform, and rights for Catholics (Catholic relief). The House of Commons (1831)
reports a list of petitions with information on content and on who had written each
of them. We geo-referenced the locations from which the petitions originated and
matched this to the parish GIS using Satchell, Kitson, Newton, Shaw-Taylor, and
Wrigley (2016).
• newspaperN is an n× 1 vector where element i is equal to one if parish i is located
within a 10km radius of a town with a local or regional newspaper, and zero otherwise.
House of Commons (1833) enables us to deduce the geography of the local and national
newspapers. This return to the House of Commons from 1833 reports the stamp duties
paid by each newspaper published in England. From the names of the newspapers,
we infer the location where the 130 local and regional newspapers were published.
We assume that county newspapers were published in the county seat. Source: House
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Table A1: Summary statistics for the panel
N mean sd min max
Riotst−1 413,400 0.0054 0.12 0 15
Riotst−1 no arrest 413,400 0.0027 0.052 0 1
Riotst−1 arrest 413,400 0.00081 0.028 0 1
W× riotst−1 413,400 0.0053 0.048 0 4.39
W× riotst−1 no arrests 413,400 0.054 0.23 0 1
W× riotst−1 arrests 413,400 0.018 0.13 0 1
CoachstopN 413,400 0.63 0.48 0 1
NewspaperN 413,400 0.22 0.41 0 1
FairsNt−1 405,760 0.18 0.52 0 14
log area × period 1 413,080 0.76 1.08 0 5.46
log area × period 2 413,080 0.70 1.06 0 5.46
of Commons (1833). Outside of London, all 130 local or regional newspapers were
weeklies. In London there were 12 dailies (with The Times being by far the largest),
seven newspapers were published three times a week, one twice a week and 37 once a
week.
• Log distance to garrison is an n×1 vector where element i is the natural logarithm
of the “as the crow flies” distance in kilometers from a parish’s centroid to the nearest
army or navy garrison. Source: War Office (1830).
• policeN is an n×1 vector where element i is equal to one if parish i is located within
a 10km radius of a town with a police force. Source: Clark (2014).
Tables A1 and A2 show the summary statistics for the riot variables and the fundamen-
tals.
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Table A2: Summary statistics for the cross section
N mean sd min max
Riots 10,335 0.22 0.91 0 20
Log area 10,335 2.19 0.90 0.00074 6.09
Log population 10,317 6.11 1.24 0 12.0
High wage, cereal 10,335 0.10 0.30 0 1
Low wage, dairy 10,335 0.34 0.47 0 1
Low wage, cereal 10,335 0.41 0.49 0 1
Log families in agriculture 10,317 3.73 1.14 0 6.77
Log farmers 10,317 2.47 1.01 0 5.66
Log manufacturing workers 10,317 0.50 1.28 0 9.38
Log trader and craftmen 10,317 3.02 1.58 0 9.86
Log professionals 10,317 1.37 1.31 0 8.60
Log males 10,317 5.42 1.21 0 11.2
Enclosed before 1830 10,335 0.36 0.48 0 1
Log wealth 9,492 1.99 0.54 0 5.76
MarketN 10,335 0.92 0.27 0 1
CoachstopN 10,335 0.63 0.48 0 1
Log petitions 10,335 0.25 0.51 0 4.06
NewspaperN 10,335 0.22 0.41 0 1
Log distance to garrison 10,335 10.7 0.88 3.51 11.9
PoliceN 10,335 0.37 0.48 0 1
W× riots 10,335 0.21 0.36 0 4.72
B Supplementary material (not for publication)
This appendix presents the additional robustness checks referred to in the main text.
Table A3: Panel estimates with a binary weight matrix
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Riots Riots
WNR × riotst−1 0.0029 0.0030
(0.00097)*** (0.00098)***
WNR × riotst−2 -0.00069
(0.00035)**
WNR × riotst−3 -0.000090
(0.00025)
riotst−1 0.032 0.031
(0.016)** (0.016)*
riotst−1 -0.016
(0.0065)**
riotst−1 -0.021
(0.0054)***
Observations 403,065 382,395
R-squared 0.002 0.003
Parish FE Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Standard errors Conley Conley
Estimation OLS OLS
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports specifications
similar to those of Table 2, columns (1) and (2) except that the weighting matrix is not row-normalized.
Instead, the entries in the weighting matrix WNR corresponding to parishes with centroids within 10km
from each other are set to 1, while all other entries are set to 0 and the diagonal entries are all set to 0, so
that a parish is not its own neighbor. This weighting system gives all riots within the neighborhood the
same weight irrespective of how they relate to the underlying parish structure, so that two riots in the same
parish count as much as two riots, each in a different parish. As a consequence the interpretation of the
coefficient on WNR × riotst−1 is different. One extra exogenous riot (somewhere) in the neighborhood of
a parish in week t− 1 leads to an increase in the expected number of riots in that parish of between 0.0029
and 0.0030 in week t. This direct effect is relatively large, given that the unconditional expected number
of riots in a parish in any given week is 0.005.
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Table A4: Panel estimates with different temporal lag structures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Riots Riots Riots Riots Riots
W× riotst−1 0.085 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.087
(0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)***
W× riotst−2 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019
(0.0092)** (0.0090)** (0.0091)** (0.0094)**
W× riotst−3 -0.0041 -0.0021 -0.0023
(0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0067)
W× riotst−4 -0.0012 0.00010
(0.0066) (0.0070)
W× riotst−5 0.0016
(0.0051)
W× riotst−6 -0.00077
(0.0046)
W× riotst−7 0.0025
(0.0049)
W× riotst−8 0.0011
(0.0044)
W× riotst−9 -0.0054
(0.0048)
W× riotst−10 0.00088
(0.0051)
Riotst−1 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.0095
(0.016)* (0.016)* (0.016)* (0.016)* (0.016)
Riotst−2 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.034
(0.0065)** (0.0065)** (0.0065)*** (0.0070)***
Riotst−3 -0.021 -0.021 -0.037
(0.0054)*** (0.0054)*** (0.0064)***
Riotst−4 -0.021 -0.036
(0.0049)*** (0.0058)***
Riotst−5 -0.040
(0.0058)***
Riotst−6 -0.042
(0.0052)***
Riotst−7 -0.044
(0.0051)***
Riotst−8 -0.045
(0.0051)***
Riotst−9 -0.044
(0.0055)***
Riotst−10 -0.050
(0.0055)***
Observations 403,065 392,730 382,395 372,060 310,050
Parish FE YES YES YES YES YES
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors Conley Conley Conley Conley Conley
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports specifications
similar to those of Table 2, column (2) but with different lags of riots in own parish and in the neighborhood.
Table A5: Panel estimates with a 20km neighborhood
(1) (2)
Riots Riots
W20km × riotst−1 0.0017 0.0018
(0.00046)*** (0.00048)***
W20km × riotst−2 -0.00050
(0.00016)***
W20km × riotst−3 0.000065
(0.000078)
riotst−1 0.027 0.025
(0.016)* (0.016)
riotst−2 -0.015
(0.0063)**
riotst−3 -0.021
(0.0053)***
Observations 403,065 382,395
R-squared 0.004 0.005
Parish FE Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Standard errors Conley Conley
Estimation OLS OLS
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports specifications
similar to those of Table 2, columns (1) and (2) except that the weighting matrix, W20km, is a row-
normalized weight matrix with entries corresponding to parishes with centroids within 20km being non-
zero, and all other entries set to 0. The rows of the matrix add up to 1. If parish i has n neighbors within
a radium of 20km, then each entry in row i corresponding to a neighbor carries a weight of 1/n.
Table A6: Cross-section estimates: the contextual effects
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Riots Riots
W× riots 0.63 0.52
(0.048)*** (0.068)***
W× Log area -0.11 -0.66
(0.030)*** (0.19)***
W× Log population 0.32 1.07
(0.25) (1.56)
W× Low wage, cereal 0.15 0.43
(0.15) (0.52)
W× Log families in agriculture 0.058 0.58
(0.021)*** (0.16)***
W× Log traders and craftmen 0.029 0.074
(0.034) (0.26)
W×Log professionals -0.040 -0.15
(0.034) (0.20)
W× Log males -0.37 -1.39
(0.24) (1.71)
W× Log petitions -0.089 -0.27
(0.064) (0.34)
W× policeN -0.077 -0.075
(0.057) (0.22)
Observations 10,309 10,309
R-squared 0.193
Fixed effects County County
Fundamentals YES YES
Standard errors Conley Cluster by par
Estimation OLS Poisson
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports two specifications
of the spatial Durbin model with contextual effects estimated with OLS or a Poisson estimator. Both
specifications include the nine fundamentals that were significant in Table 8 and county fixed effects,
but to preserve space, only the contextual effects are reported. The contextual effects are defined as
W× fundamentals where the weight matrix W is row-normalized so that the sum of entries in any row
j adds to 1. This means that it is the average of each of the nine fundamentals in the 10km neighborhood
of a parish. In the table, we use the notation W × fundamentalk to indicate the contextual effect of
fundamental k.
Figure M1: Map of the location of fairs
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Notes: Each green dot represents a fair.
Figure M2: Map of the location of coach stops and regional newspapers
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Notes: Each purple dot represents a coach stop and each red triangle represents a town with a newspaper.
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Figure M3: Map of the location of police stations and garrisons
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Notes: Each green diamond represents a garrison and each blue dot represents a police station.
